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THE BRITISH POLICY TOWARD INDEPENDENT TEXAS
AS SEEN BY A SOVIET HISTORIAN
by Nina V. Potokova
CHIASSR State University, USSR

Soviet historians have done extensive research in United States history.
Their emphases chronologically center upon the struggle for Independence
and its immediate aftermath, the early National history, the Civil War,
and the New Deal. Thematically, the focus has been on the labor and trade
union movement, the history of the two-party system, the development
of Soviet-American relations, and current United States policies. Very
recently, research has been broadening still further. A major event was
the publication between 1983 and 1987 of a four-volume History of the
United States of America. Nevertheless, Soviet historians have neglected
the history of the separate states. The writer's own publications represent
pioneer work in this area. At the first All-Union meeting of Soviet
Americanists in Moscow in 1971, she pointed out the importance of
studying both the process of American westward expansion and the history
of the individual states. I The result has been the publication of two books
on the expansionist theme, but no advance with regard to state history. 2
In Soviet Libraries and archives are numerous documents on
American history. These have been supplemented by new material, as it
appears. Still, there is nothing to match an immediate personal acquaintance with a country and its libraries and archives. In 1979 I spent some
time in the United States doing research. In this connection, I would like
to express my gratitude to Professors Idris Traylor and Lowell L. Blaisdell,
and to Director David Murrah and Associate Archivist Doris A. Blaisdell,
both of the Southwest Collection, and all four at Texas Tech, for their
help to me. Others also helped on a lesser scale. As the result of my research
in Texas history, on my return I was able to publish a number of papers
and a book, The Annexation of Texas . .l
Among the problems of interest concerning independent Texas, one
that attracts special attention is that of the British policy toward the
Republic. Despite the Monroe Doctrine, this European power showed a
very noticeable inclination to try to extend her influence over the great
territory that had detached itself from Mexico, but stayed separate from
the United States.

Dr. Nina v: Potokova received her Ph.D. from the University of Moscow. She is Professor ofHistory at the State Univers ity of Grozny, Us. S. R. In 1979 she spent several
months in Texas doing research, and giving guest lectures at Texas Tech University,
Lubbock, Texas. She is the author of a book, The Annexation of Texas. and of other
published writings: "The History ofTexas, 1519-1821," «The Colonization ofTexas by
Americans, 1821-1846," liThe Texan War of1835~1836," and "The MexU:an·American
War of1846-1848. Lowell L. Blaisdell of Texas Tech University edited this article for
publication.
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In examining the British role, this paper is based on references from
the British archives, even though unfortunately I have not had the opportunity to work in them directly. In the Lenin Public Library in Moscow
are various source materials, including the London Times in its entirety,
selections from other portions of the British press, and some other original
documents.
It is the object of this paper to explore the economic and political
forces behind British actions, and to emphasize how desirous Britain was
to prevent the Republic's absorption into the United States. Such eminent American historians as Ephraim D. Adams and Frederick Merk, for
example. seem to imply that Britain fonowed an essentially conciliatory
policy, eventually accepting Texas' annexation by the United States in a
resigned frame of mind. 3 However, as records show. their officials strove
to maintain Texas' independence, hoping to exercise a large influence in
the Southwest and to have Texas serve as a buffer between the United
States and Mexico.

Britain did not recognize Texas until 1842. While throughout Texas'
independence, there were forces drawing England and the Lone Star
Republic toward each other that outweighed the ones keeping them apart,
the latter were of sufficient importance to retard recognition for some
years. One source of strain was that, with Britain having just abolished
slavery in her West Indies islands, its presence in the new commonwealth
represented a considerable obstacle. In the House of Commons, a wellknown abolitionist, Barlow Hoy, instigated debates and pestered the
government with regard to the Texans' acceptance of slavery and involvement in the slave trade. This issue had some impact on policy. In an
editorial, "Texas and Slavery," the London Times offered as its opinion
that the "United States annexation of Texas will result in the spread and
perpetuation of slavery."5 Other British papers asserted that Britain and
France were willing to recognize the Southwesterners' breakaway from
Mexico only if slavery were abolished. 6
Another restraining factor stemmed from Britain's multiple interests
in the northern hemisphere. Because the Americans continually pushed
northward into Canada's eastern and westernmost extremities. Britain had
to take account of these pressures on a plane of importance equal to. if
not greater than, the issue of Texas' relations with the United States.
Canada, an outright possession, deserved greater attention than Texas.
Yet, in view of the United States' swift expansion, to stand by while she
next made a valuable addition to the southwest was an event to be forestalled, if possible. Lesser aspects of England's varied responsibilities concerned
her conflicting interests in Mexico, and the question of Texas' solidity.
In relations with Mexico, since British citizens were invested in Mexican
mines, here was a reason for encouraging Texas' emergence as a buffer
state to block any United States push toward Mexico. On the other hand,
British shareholders in Mexican bonds had recently had them refunded
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on the security of public lands in northern Mexico. The bondholders did
not want recognition of Texas, lest this arouse Mexico's ire, and thus
diminish their chances of repayment. 7 As for Texas itself, it might hardly
be worth encouraging. Its finances were in such a plight that no European power - to most of which the Texans applied - was willing to grant
the Lone Star state a loan.
By comparison to Britain, France did not have the same complicated
problems. This simplified her Texas policy. On September 25, 1839, France
became the first European power to recognize the Lone Star republic. In
the Franco-Texas Treaty of Navigation, Trade and Friendship there was
provision for cotton shipping to France. Soon, through J .B. Dubois de
Savigny, the charge'd'affaires in Texas, France sought to gain a huge
3,OOO,OOO-acre land concession. Following France, the Netherlands signed a Treaty of Trade, Navigation and Friendship, September I, 1840,
thereby also granting recognition.
As for the Texans, for obvious reasons they cultivated friendly relations with England even more than France. As an example, in response
to reports in the North of slave trading that tended to create a poor impression of Texas in Great Britain, the Telegraph and Texas Register
argued that since slaves were cheap and money scarce, the importation
of African slaves was not occurring because it was unprofitable. According to this paper, "After the revolution took place, not a single party
of African slaves landed on the Texas coast. "8 Actually small groups of
slaves were smuggled in as late as 1858. 9

,

11.

Meantime, in the case of the British, the elements that tended to advance relations with Texas to the primary plane became increasingly
weighty. The most potent factor drawing the island nation and Texas
toward each other was that the Industrial Revolution in the first and the
rise in cotton production in the second coincided. In general, Southern
cotton found a ready market in the British textile industry. In Texas, the
rich virgin soil of the settled areas proved to be very suitable to cotton
production. As early as April I, 1826, the Nashville (Tennessee)
Republican. as part of an advertisement aimed at attracting colonists,
reported that "Local soils yield 2500 to 3000 weight of the world's best
cotton per each acre of Texas lands." 10 This is probably not much of an
overstatement of the agricultural potential of Texas at the time.
According to John MacGregor. in his then authoritative history of

the United States, The Progress of America from the Discovery by Columbus to the Year 1846, the export of cotton from Texas to the United
States went up from 1,473,133 to 7,593,107 pounds between 1836 and 1843.
The total value increased from $232,336.00 to $379,750.00 despite the price
reduction caused by the economic slump in 1837. II
In England, while the sugar interests took a dim view of Texas due
to its potential for becoming a rival of British West Indies sugar produc-
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tion, the textile manufacturers' pro-Texas attitude was much more influential. At the time, England imported considerable cotton from the slaveholding South. despite the tariffs imposed on her products by the manufacturing North. It was easy to see that in the emergence of a new cotton
market in an independent Texas unencumbered by United States tariffs,
a great opportunity existed for British textile manufacturers to import a
cheap raw product.
By the 1840s British trade with Texas far exceeded that of France
and was somewhat greater than any other country except the United States.
This exasperated chargeid' affaires Saligny in his reports to his government. In his letter to Adolphe Thiers, June 17, 1840, he complained that
only a single French ship from Marseilles had reached Texas. Meantime.
though Britain had not even recognized the new state. eight or nine of
her crafts had arrived in the course of the previous eighteen months, and
"two more ships were soon expected in Matagorda."tl Saligny saw the
English traders as constantly outdoing his countrymen, to their own and
their nation's profit. In February 1841 he complained to Paris again.
remarking that since winter had set in, five new British ships had arrived
at Galveston and Matagorda. They had left loaded with cotton, while the
Marseilles one continued to be the only one under French flag in the
Republic's ports.
I]

Texas' trade quickly expanded in scope. Over the entire year of 1844,
at Galveston alone fifty-four United States cargo ships anchored, eleven
British ones, thirteen from the German port of Bremen, one from France,
one from the Austrian Empire, and three from Belgium. In the same year,
twenty-seven American cargo ships departed. loaded with cotton valued
at $33,500. and fifteen British ones carrying L59,OOO worth of cotton. Further. ten Bremen ships left, the three from Belgium, and the one each from
Austria and France. 14 In its trade with Texas, Great Britain stood second
only to the United States.
Along with the economic considerations encouraging close BritishTexas ties, there existed a very important political one: the need to try
to find some means to curb the seemingly insatiable appetite for territorial
expansion of the United States. So far did the Americans' roving eye extend that they were suspected - correctly as it soon turned out - of aiming at California. IS If Texans were stabilized as an independent nation,
this clearly would constitute an obstacle to the United States' westward
outreach. Thus it is easy to see why in 1837 Foreign Secretary Lord
Palmerston suggested in a communication to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Thomas Spring-Rice that " .. .it would be better that Texas should
not be incorporated with the Union."16
By 1841·1842, the mutual attractions between Britain and Texas were
large enough to bring recognition from the first. Three treaties were
prepared. As the price of recognition, Britain insisted in one of them that
Texas agree to bring to an end any of her citizens' participation in the

•
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slave trade. Further, England nudged her foot in the door for a future
expanded influence by means of a clause in one of the treaties providing
for her to act as intermediary in Texas' troubles with Mexico. On its side,
Texas, as a gesture, offered to pay part of Mexico's debt to Great Britain, which amounted to L9,OOO,OOO. Two of the treaties the Texas Senate
ratified in 1841, but it took until the following year for it to accept the
one abolishing the slave trade. That done, ratification papers were exchanged, and on June 28, 1842, Great Britain formally recognized the Texas
Republic. 17
In so acting, England committed herself to Texas' future. Since at
least at that moment Texas' acceptance of slavery represented a major
obstacle to the North's willingness to accept the Lone Star Republic into
the Union, it was in Britain's interest to bolster her Southwestern friend's
inclination to stay independent, and thus to enhance the likelihood that
Albion herself would be able before long to exert a large, long-term
influence.
On Texas' side, for some time her leaders, feeling endangered by Mexico's continued threats and her unwillingness to concede independence,
and spurned by the United States, were in a mood to be susceptible to
blandishments. As former President Anton Jones wrote, Texas brought
home to Britain that she had' 'cotton lands enough to raise sufficient of
this great staple for the supply of the world. Texas was then [Le., about
1843] a rich j ewellying derelict by the way. " 18 As a further example, the
famous Samuel Houston, writing charge'd'affairs Sir Charles Elliot in
1843. compared the United States territorial voraciousness to Rome of
the late Republic and Empire. In response, it made him " ...desire to see
Texas occupy an independent position among the Nations of the earth." 19
In the effort to encourage Texas, England in the early 1840s had at
her back the moral support of France and the other European powers,
all of whom were concerned about the rapidly growing potency of the
United States. This was so to such a degree at about 1843 that in one-time
President Jones' opinion afterwards. war between the United States on
the one hand and Britain, France, and Mexico on the other was entirely
possible. 20
!-

However, more important than the European powers' attitude at a
distance was the need to induce Mexico to concede Texas' independence
in time to forestall any possible increase of a favorable attitude toward

annexation in the United States. Likewise essential was the nerve to brazen
out accusations from the United States of undue interference in New World
affairs on the part of Uncle Sam's favorite scapegoat and old-time enemy.
We have indications of the efforts to realize the first objective. In
July 1843, Elliot sent a note to President Jones, a copy of which he
dispatched to the new Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Aberdeen. In it, he
offered" ... assurances of the continued interest left by Her Majesty's
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Government in the prosperity and independence of Texas, and of the full
determination to persevere in efforts for the peaceful adjustment of the
difficulties between this country (i.e., Texas) and Mexico, whenever a hope
of success should present itself." 21 As further evidence, in 1844, as the
possibility of United States annexation became more likely, Britain and
France drew up a joint statement that time did not permit them to put
into effect. It read: "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom and
Ireland and His Majesty the King of the French [are] strongly impressed
with the importance of restoring Peace between the Republick of Texas
and the Mexican Republick and of the establishment and preservation of
the Republick of Texas as an Independent State under her own national
Government. ' '22
As it turned out, Britain failed in the attainment of both of her essential tactical needs, but not because she switched to a restrained and uninvolved policy. What changed was the person of the foreign secretary. Had
the ever-aggressive Palmerston continued in office until the mid-40s, he
surely would have pressed Mexico extremely hard to grant recognition to
Texas without a moment more of delay, and he would have answered
belligerently any American complaints of interference in New World concerns. However, his successor, the cautious Aberdeen, moved more sluggishly than he. and outcries from the United States made him hesitate.
Loose talk had spread in the United States of British intentions to bring
about the abolition of slavery everywhere, induding Texas, and thus
threatening the security of the southern half of the country. Through his
minister to Washington, Richard Pakenham, Aberdeen gave reassurance
of Britain's intention not to impose its influence in Texas nor try to abolish
slavery there. 23 He later warned Elliot, "You... should observe the greatest
caution in all your dealings and conversation with the authorities of Texas,
and... you should in no way commit your Government to any line of active policy with regard to that Country." 24
That Aberdeen's fundamental outlook, however, was no different
from Palmerston's is made plain by what he wrote next: "We consider
that Independence of the highest importance for Mexico, for Texas herself,
and even eventually for the United States, to which country, in the opinion of her Majesty's Government, the possession of Texas, although it
might at the present Moment satisfy the peculiar interests of the South,
and gratify the National vanity of all the States, would scarce fail, in no
long time, to become a serious source of Contention, between the Northern
and the Southern States and, at the same time expose the whole Confederation to great hazard." 2S
It was too late. The Democrats' victory in the November 1844 election made the United States acceptance of Texas more likely. It came to
pass, when on March 1, 1845, Congress, by joint resolution of the two
houses, case a majority in favor of incorporating the Lone Star entity. Thus,
through inability to act rapidly and decisively, Britain found that time
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had overtaken her desires. Belatedly, Elliott in a secret, unauthorized trip
to Mexico in May 1845, finally prevailed upon that nation to admit Texas'
independence. In the recognition a provision was attached specifying that
Texas must not unite with another. The Texas Congress, given the choice
of an independence with this restriction, as well as no guarantee from Britain and France, or the offer to join the United States, much preferred
the latter. It was unanimously so voted, June 16, 1845.
As for the afterward, William Kennedy, the British consul in Texas
from 1841 to 1847, writing to Aberdeen's successor, the reinstituted
Palmerston, gave it as his view that Britain could have forestalled annexation without producing war. By implication, he criticized Aberdeen as
showing insufficient determination. 26 All along, England had striven for
an independent Texas, at whose side she hoped to stand as overseer and
patron. Had this come to pass, the United States would have had a more
stunted future than came her way through the acquisition of Texas.
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